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Abstract 
Recent theoretical literature has debated the desirability of permitting debtors to 
contract with lenders over control rights in bankruptcy. Proponents point to the 
monitoring benefits brought from concentrating control rights in the hands of a 
single lender. Detractors point to the costs imposed on other creditors by a 
senior claimant’s inadequate incentives to maximise net recoveries. The UK 
provides the setting for a natural experiment regarding these theories. Until 
recently, UK bankruptcy law permitted firms to give complete ex post control to 
secured creditors, through a procedure known as Receivership. Receivership 
was replaced in 2003 by a new procedure, Administration, which was intended 
to introduce greater accountability to unsecured creditors to the governance of 
bankrupt firms, through a combination of voting rights and fiduciary duties. We 
present empirical findings from a hand-coded sample of 348 bankruptcies from 
both before and after the change in the law, supplemented with qualitative 
interview data. We find robust evidence that whilst gross realisations have 
increased following the change in the law, these have tended to be eaten up by 
concomitantly increased bankruptcy costs. The net result has been that creditor 
recoveries have remained unchanged. This implies that dispersed and 
concentrated creditor governance in bankruptcy may be functionally equivalent.  
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1. Introduction 
Secured creditors in the US have in recent years been exerting ever-greater 
influence over financially-distressed companies (Baird and Rasmussen, 2002; 
Skeel, 2004). This has lead to a lively debate over the desirability of secured 
creditor control. Proponents point to the benefits that a concentrated creditor 
can bring to the governance of a firm. This lowers investors’ monitoring costs.  
Moreover, all-encompassing secured credit facilitates control by the secured 
lender, especially when combined with revolving overdraft facilities and 
extensive loan covenants (Scott, 1986; Franks and Sussman, 2005; Baird and 
Rasmussen, 2006; Armour, 2006). Thus a concentrated secured lender is in a 
position to assist in keeping the debtor’s management under control (Triantis, 
1995; Baird and Rasmussen, 2002).   
 
Bankruptcy law modifies the rights of investors so as to impose a collective 
governance mechanism on a distressed firm and its creditors. This can, 
depending on the procedure employed, greatly impede the control that secured 
creditors are capable of exercising. Some argue that it is undesirable for 
bankruptcy law to do this, and that firms should be left free to write contracts 
with their creditors concerning how control rights will be allocated in default 
states (Rasmussen, 1992; Schwartz, 1998). Others, however, are strongly 
critical of such proposals, pointing to the possibilities for rent-seeking by those 
in control of such a process (LoPucki, 1999; Westbrook, 2004). 
 
Policy-makers in the UK have grappled with these issues in a recent bankruptcy 
reform, the results of which may be of interest to participants in these debates 
elsewhere. Until recently, control in UK bankruptcy proceedings lay firmly in 
the hands of secured creditors. A creditor holding a floating charge (a security 
interest similar to the UCC’s floating lien) had the right to appoint an 
administrative receiver, who had plenary powers to manage the debtor firm and 
yet owed fiduciary duties only to the secured creditor. It was widely thought 
that this receivership system had lead to excessive liquidations and inflated 
bankruptcy costs: senior claimants lack incentives to maximise recoveries and 
minimise costs in cases where the firm’s assets are worth more than the face 
value of the senior debt. Secured creditor control, it was thought, therefore 
tended to reduce recoveries for junior claimants. In response to these concerns, 
the UK’s Enterprise Act 2002 effected a transformation of the governance of 
corporate bankruptcies, shifting power from secured to unsecured creditors. 
This was done by abolishing the secured creditor’s right to appoint a receiver: 
under the new regime, they may instead appoint an administrator, who owes 
fiduciary duties to all the creditors, and must put proposals for the exit from 
proceedings to a vote of unsecured creditors.  
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We present the results of the first systematic empirical comparison of the UK’s 
old and new bankruptcy regimes. We analyse a hand-coded sample of 348 
bankruptcy cases, comprising 153 administrative receiverships commencing in 
2001-2003 and 195 administrations commencing in 2003 and 2004, after the 
change in the law.
1
 We find robust evidence that, as compared with 
administrative receivership, the new administration procedure tends to generate 
both higher gross recoveries and higher direct costs. The net result is that there 
has been no overall change in creditors’ net recoveries. Moreover, there is no 
significant difference in the number of bankrupt firms that are kept open under 
the new regime. We interpret these findings as casting doubt on strong 
theoretical claims for the superiority of one form of investor governance in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the structure of 
UK corporate bankruptcy law, both before and after the recent change. Section 
3 reviews prior literature on bankruptcy costs and develops hypotheses. Section 
4 describes our data. Results are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes 
with a discussion of the implications.  
 
2. UK Bankruptcy Law 
US federal bankruptcy law offers distressed debtors two options for formal 
bankruptcy: Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. Chapter 7 involves the transfer of the 
control of the firm to a creditor-appointed Trustee. In Chapter 11, as is well-
known, the debtor’s management usually remain in control of the firm during 
the proceedings. The current  US Bankruptcy Code was introduced in 1978. At 
first, creditors found that debtors had a high degree of control, especially in 
smaller cases (LoPucki, 1983). However, over time, creditors responded by 
writing more stringent contracts regarding the provision of finance to firms in 
Chapter 11 proceedings, thereby reasserting a significant degree of control 
(Baird and Rasmussen, 2002; Skeel, 2004).  
 
Yet the creditor control exerted in Chapter 11, even now, is weak compared to 
that which was, until recently, enjoyed by secured creditors in UK bankruptcy 
situations. English insolvency law did not historically impose a stay on the 
enforcement of secured claims. This permitted a secured creditor holding an all-
encompassing security interest—known in the UK as a ‘floating charge’—to 
enforce against the entirety of the debtor firm’s assets. In effect, the floating 
charge holder (FCH) conducted a private liquidation, known as an 
‘administrative receivership’ (or ‘receivership’ for short). When English law 
was modified in 1985 to include a stay on the enforcement of all security, in a 
new ‘administration’ procedure, a special carve-out was granted for FCHs: they 
were given a veto over the commencement of administration proceedings. The 
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upshot was that a creditor with a floating charge still enjoyed unfettered control 
rights over the appointment of a receiver (Armour and Frisby, 2001). 
 
Under the English system, firms ‘opted in’ to the private liquidation procedure 
by writing a contract with a secured creditor whereby a floating charge was 
granted. For those US scholars who have debated the merits of contracting over 
bankruptcy, the UK has sometimes been cited as an example of a system where 
such contracting was possible (Schwartz, 1998; Westbrook, 2004). An 
empirical study of the effects of the UK’s recent shift away from its system of 
secured creditor control may therefore be of interest to both sides of the US 
debates.  
 
2.1 Criticisms of Receivership  
Many in the UK were critical of the receivership system (Benveniste, 1986; 
Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Milman and Mond, 1999; Finch, 1999; Mokal, 
2004). The principal objection was that giving decision rights to the secured 
creditor created a perverse incentive. Where the value of the firm’s assets was 
greater than the amount of secured debt owed, then the secured creditor would 
not be the residual claimant. Rather, they would, it was feared, have an 
incentive simply to seek repayment of their money as quickly as possible. This 
would, it was argued, tend to lead to a bias against continuation of distressed 
firms, on the basis that closure and piecemeal liquidation would typically be 
quicker (Benveniste, 1986; Aghion et al, 1992). Of course, in cases where the 
value of the firm’s assets was less than the amount of secured debt owed (that 
is, the secured creditor was not undersecured), they would be the residual 
claimant and hence concerns about excess costs and precipitate liquidation 
would not be pressing (Armour and Frisby, 2001). Secured creditors were 
thought to be undersecured in just under half of all UK insolvencies during the 
late 1990s (Armour and Mokal, 2005). 
 
Several other criticisms were levelled against the receivership system. It was 
argued that because receivership involved a sale of assets and did not permit a 
corporate reorganisation, good businesses might be forced to close (Insolvency 
Service, 2001; Mokal, 2004).
2
 Secondly, it was thought that the procedure 
rendered the receiver insufficiently accountable to those who were affected by 
her actions in many cases, namely unsecured creditors (Insolvency Service, 
2001). A particular manifestation of this problem concerned costs: it was argued 
that oversecured lenders would fail to monitor the costs incurred by insolvency 
professionals in carrying out their functions, such that the fees and remuneration 
expenditure would be needlessly and wastefully inflated (Mokal, 2004).  
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2.2 The New Administration Procedure 
In 2001, the UK government announced a package of reforms to bankruptcy 
law that were intended to correct the perceived problems with receivership 
(Insolvency Service, 2001). These were implemented in the Enterprise Act 
2002, which came into force on 15 September 2003. In essence, they involved 
two steps. First, the entitlement of an FCH to appoint an administrative receiver 
was (with some limited exceptions) abolished. This abolition was prospective, 
in the sense that it applied only to security interests created after 15 September 
2003. In return, FCHs are now given the right to appoint an administrator out of 
court. This is intended to preserve the usefulness, for the governance of small 
firms, of giving a concentrated creditor the power to initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings and replace management very quickly. 
 
The second major change has been to remodel the administration procedure. As 
before, it involves a stay of all claims, secured and unsecured. Unlike before, 
the decision-making process is now explicitly geared towards the maximisation 
of ex post value by the administrator. Two mechanisms of accountability seek to 
ensure this. First, the administrator must put proposals to a creditors’ meeting 
for a vote within eight to ten weeks of appointment.
3
 The vote is taken by the 
unsecured creditors, unless the administrator thinks that they will receive no 
recoveries, in which case secured creditors vote.
4
 This structure can be 
understood as seeking to ensure that voting power resides in the hands of the 
residual claimant. Of course, the correct identification of the residual claimant 
depends upon the administrator’s evaluation of the firm’s value at the 
commencement of formal proceedings.  
 
The second mechanism of accountability is the administrator’s legal duties. He 
owes duties to act in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole, to 
perform his functions as quickly and efficiently as possible, and is statutorily 
obliged to pursue a hierarchy of objectives.
5
 The first two of these are, 
respectively, (i) the rescue of the company as a going concern; and (ii) the 
achievement of a better result for the company’s (unsecured) creditors than in 
liquidation. As between these, he must seek to do that which will yield the 
highest return for the (unsecured) creditors. In effect, he is legally obliged to 
seek to maximise the returns for the unsecured creditors—either through a 
corporate reorganisation (objective (i)), where possible—or failing that, through 
any other technique (e.g. sale of the business as a going concern, or work 
through of existing contracts) that will yield more for the creditors than an 
immediate fire sale (objective (ii)). Where the administrator thinks that neither 
(i) nor (ii) is reasonably practicable, then he may seek instead to realise assets 
for the benefit of a secured creditor, provided that in so doing he does not 
unnecessarily harm the interests of unsecured creditors. In essence, this 
statutory hierarchy is, like the voting mechanisms, intended to ensure that the 
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administrator has appropriate incentives to maximise returns ex post (Armour 
and Mokal, 2005).  
 
However, doubts have been raised as to whether these new legal mechanisms of 
accountability will result in a significant improvement for unsecured creditors 
(Frisby, 2004; Armour and Mokal, 2005). First, it should be noted that secured 
creditors will still retain considerable control over rescue proceedings. The FCH 
will in most cases be responsible for the selection and appointment of the 
administrator. Banks typically operate ‘panels’ for the selection of accountants 
to act as their insolvency practitioners, which will impose reputational 
constraints on the latter’s’ actions: those appointees who take steps contrary to 
the banks’ interests in the course of an appointment may expect not to be 
appointed again. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the new regime 
makes no provision for ‘statutory super-priority’ to be granted to those 
advancing funds to the bankrupt firm. Thus the company’s existing bankers will 
retain control of funding during administration proceedings. This will make it 
practically impossible in many cases for an administrator, even if so minded, to 
achieve an outcome contrary to that desired by the secured creditor. 
 
Secondly, it has been argued that it will be difficult to bring an action 
successfully for breach of the new legal duties, because they are framed in such 
a way as to give the administrator the benefit of a generous business judgement 
rule (Frisby, 2004). The choice between the hierarchy of objectives is based 
upon what the administrator ‘thinks’, a subjective term designed to accord 
respect to the office-holder’s ‘business judgment’. In practice, it will be 
extremely difficult to demonstrate that the relevant criteria were not satisfied. 
Relatedly, some have suggested that it is so difficult to know how to interpret a 
duty to act ‘efficiently’ that it is perhaps intended merely to be hortatory, rather 
than genuinely justiciable (Sealy and Milman, 2005). 
 
3. Previous Literature and Formulation of Hypotheses 
The change in UK law effected by the Enterprise Act 2002 may be summarised 
as follows: the secured creditor’s control of bankruptcy proceedings is reduced, 
in favour of increased control granted to unsecured claimants. This transfer is 
effected through two new mechanisms of accountability: (i) legal duties to all 
the creditors; (ii) the requirement for approval by a creditors’ meeting. We 
might expect these changes to have an impact on realisations and on costs of 
proceedings. In this section, we examine prior literature on these issues and 
formulate hypotheses about the likely determinants of realisations and 
bankruptcy costs. To assist us in structuring our intuitions about the changes in 
practice, we conducted  thirteen open-ended interviews with professionals 
involved in UK bankruptcy proceedings. Summary details of interview subjects 
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are tabulated in Table 1, and relevant findings are identified at appropriate 
points in the text. 
 
Table 1: Summary details of interview subjects 
 
Interview  
Number 
Date Profession Location Expertise Digital Record 
1. 06-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
Birmingham  N 
2. 12-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
Nottingham  N 
3. 20-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (‘big 
four’ firm) 
Birmingham  N 
4. 21-07-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (‘big 
four’ firm) 
Birmingham  N 
5. 24-08-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
Birmingham  N 
6. 08-11-05 Regulator (IPA)  London  N 
7. 08-11-05 Insolvency 
Practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
London  N 
8. 22-12-05 Regulator (IPA) London  N 
9. 22-12-05 Insolvency 
practitioner (mid-
market firm) 
London  N 
10. 18-04-06 Accountant/pensions 
expert (‘big four’ 
firm) 
London  Y 
11. 03-05-06 Credit insurer London  Y 
12. 19-06-06 Banker (clearing 
bank) 
London  Y 
13. 30-06-06 Banker (clearing 
bank) 
Bristol  N 
 
3.1 Realisations 
Administration versus administrative receivership 
The imposition of new governance mechanisms rendering the office-holder 
accountable to all the creditors might therefore be expected to result in 
increased recoveries, because the administrator would thereby have better 
incentives to maximise realisations. Whilst a number of our interview subjects 
stated that the change in the law would have little effect on the way in which 
bankruptcies were run, some insolvency practitioners did indicate that it would 
cause them to be more careful in thinking about how best to realise the assets. 
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Hypothesis 1: Realisations may be expected to be larger in administrations than 
in administrative receiverships.  
 
We would expect any such difference to be more pronounced in cases where the 
value of the bankrupt firm’s assets are more than the amount of secured debt. 
This is because, if the assets are worth less than the secured debt, then in a 
receivership, the secured creditor will have appropriate incentives to maximise 
value.
6
  
 
Measuring realisations 
Realisations can be measured straightforwardly as gross recoveries by the 
insolvency practitioner. However, where trading is involved, results may differ 
depending on whether trading receipts and/or trading expenses are included. 
This yields three possible measures of realisations: (i) asset realisations 
(excluding trading); (ii) asset realisations, including gross trading receipts; (iii) 
asset realisations including net trading receipts (deducting operating costs for 
trading). These might in turn be measured either (i) simply in absolute value 
terms; or (ii) relative to the value of the assets at the outset of proceedings. If 
the absolute value of the assets is used, then it will of course be necessary to 
control for the size of the firm’s assets at the commencement of proceedings.  
 
3.2 Costs 
Types of bankruptcy cost 
The literature typically divides the costs of bankruptcy into ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ components. Direct costs are the costs involved in running a 
procedure: that is, the fees paid to professionals such as lawyers, accountants, 
valuers, business consultants and marketing experts who are employed in 
realising the assets of the bankrupt firm and agreeing an appropriate distribution 
of the proceeds. Direct costs are relatively easy to observe, as most bankruptcy 
systems require that a record of such payments costs be kept in individual cases. 
Indirect costs encompass everything else. Ex post, they would include the costs 
of decisional error by the trustee realising the assets—that is, the costs of failing 
to allocate the distressed firm’s assets to their highest-valued use. They would 
also include the costs resulting from unnecessary delay in the completion of the 
proceedings, as this will impact negatively on the value of the firm’s goodwill. 
Indirect costs are also thought to have ex ante components, which, because they 
affect all firms, as opposed to simply those which enter bankruptcy proceedings, 
are potentially much greater (White, 1996). These include the incentive effects 
of bankruptcy on management’s investment strategy (Schwartz, 1994) and on 
the credibility of the creditor’s threat to enforce (Hart, 1995). Whilst it is 
possible to think of ways to measure ex post indirect costs, it is very difficult to 
think how this might be done for ex ante costs. 
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Direct costs 
A number of studies have investigated direct bankruptcy costs in various 
jurisdictions. These are typically reported as a ratio of total firm value, in order 
to control for firm size. Possible denominators for comparison are the value of 
the prebankruptcy assets (either at book, or estimated market value, where 
available) and the market value of postbankruptcy assets, as realised by sales 
(which can be presented either as a gross figure or net of the associated costs of 
sale). The results of various prior studies using samples of private firms, 
between them encompassing a variety of bankruptcy regimes, are summarised 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Prior literature on the direct costs of bankruptcy in private firms 
 
Mean costs, % of 
starting values 
(median) 
Mean costs, % of final 
market values (median) 
Authors 
(year) 
Jurisdiction, 
procedure, firm type 
n 
Book 
value 
Market 
value (est) 
Gross mkt 
value 
Net mkt 
value 
Lawless and 
Ferris (1997) 
US: private firms, Ch 7 98 - 6.1 (1.1) - 13.5 (2.1) 
Lawless and 
Ferris (2000) 
US: private firms, Ch 
11 
 
11
8 
- 17.6 (3.5) - 7.6 (4.7) 
 
Bris et al 
(2006) 
US: private firms, Ch 7 
 
      private firms, Ch 11 
57 
38 
22
2 
15
7 
- 
- 
- 
- 
8.1 (2.5) 
- 
16.9 (1.9) 
- 
- 
37.9 (9.6) 
- 
9.4 (3.5) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
       
Thorburn 
(2000) 
Sweden, public and 
private firms, auction  
26
3 
6.4 (4.5) - 19.1 (13.2) - 
       
Franks and 
Sussman 
(2000) 
UK, private firms, 
r’ship 
                
Administration 
41 
7 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
25.2 
26.3 
Citron et al 
(2004) 
UK, MBO firms, 
receivership 
65 - - 15.2 (14.6) 24.5 (21.3) 
 
 
Results reported in Franks and Sussman (2000) and Citron et al (2004) suggest 
that the mean costs of insolvency practitioner remuneration in a typical UK 
receivership were in the region of 25% of the value of the postbankruptcy 
assets, net of the costs of realisation. Franks and Sussman (2000) also report 
mean costs for a sample of 7 pre-Enterprise Act administrations, which were 
slightly higher, at 26.3%. However, the sample size is so small that little 
significance can be attached to this finding. 
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Other studies report costs as a fraction of gross postbankruptcy asset values. 
This tends to reduce the percentage reported. Thus Citron et al (2004) report a 
mean (median) cost of 15.2% (14.6%) of gross postbankruptcy assets for a 
sample of 65 MBO firms that subsequently went into receivership. This is 
similar to the figures reported by Thorburn (2000) for the Swedish bankruptcy 
process, in which firms are mandatorily auctioned within a year (mean 19.1%, 
median 13.2%).
7
 
 
 
However, care must be taken not to read too much into such results. LoPucki 
and Doherty (2006) suggest that scale effects (namely, that marginal direct costs 
are declining in firm size) may render fractional representations of bankruptcy 
costs meaningless. At the very least, little weight should be placed on 
comparisons where the size distribution of the samples may be different. 
 
Administration versus administrative receivership 
Administration, it has been argued, is likely to generate greater process costs 
than administrative receivership (Frisby, 2004; Armour and Mokal, 2005). The 
new procedure involves a greater likelihood of court appearances. Moreover, 
the administrator will be required to engage in several types of ‘accountability’ 
related actions that would not be necessitated under receivership: preparing and 
circulating reports to creditors; calling and conducting creditors’ meetings; 
preparing reasons for their actions, etc. All of these may be expected to lead to 
increased costs.  
 
At the same time, if it was the case that lack of control by (over)secured 
creditors tended to lead to needlessly inflated costs in receivership, then it might 
be expected that administration, with enhanced mechanisms of accountability to 
unsecured creditors, would reduce these costs (Mokal, 2004). This, however, 
assumes that unsecured creditors are in a good position to exercise control both 
directly through creditors’ meetings, and more obliquely, through the bringing 
of litigation to challenge the administrator’s conduct of his duties.   
 
A contrary view might be that unsecured creditors are typically likely to be 
dispersed and so suffer from free-rider problems in exercising control over 
insolvency practitioners. This might lead them to have difficulty in 
operationalising the new mechanisms of accountability (creditors’ meetings and 
lawsuits against insolvency practitioners). In contrast to the problems with 
concentrated creditor control, which occur only when the lender is oversecured, 
the problems of dispersed creditor governance would manifest themselves in all 
cases. When combined with increased process costs, therefore, the outcome—
ironically—might be expected to be increased costs as a result of the shift to the 
new regime.   
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Interviewees to whom we spoke confirmed these intuitions. They told us that 
there were real process costs involved in conducting a creditors’ meeting, and in 
preparing a ‘paper trail’ to guard against the risk (of uncertain magnitude) of 
legal liability. Moreover, we were told by interviewees from banks, who are 
both concentrated investors and repeat players, that they typically negotiated a 
‘bulk’ rate with insolvency practitioners regarding fee arrangements. In 
contrast, when fees are put to creditors’ meetings for approval, the unsecured 
creditors are offered a higher rate, which is accepted because the unsecured 
creditors are disinterested in the process. The foregoing leads us to formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bankruptcy costs are likely to be larger in administration than in 
administrative receivership. 
 
Other determinants of costs 
Firm size. The larger the value of the business assets at stake, the more effort is 
likely to be required to assess and market the assets (Lawless and Ferris, 2000; 
LoPucki and Doherty, 2004; Bris et al, 2006).  
 
Mode of Sale. It might be thought that in situations where the assets are sold 
piecemeal, this would be cheaper and quicker to complete than a trading / going 
concern sale, and that therefore going concern sales, or continued trading, 
would be positively correlated with fees. 
 
Length of proceedings. The longer the proceedings take to complete, the greater 
the professional fees likely to be involved. Thorburn (2000), Franks and 
Sussman (2003) and Bris et al (2006) find a positive relation between time in 
bankruptcy proceedings and bankruptcy costs.  
 
3.3 Other Outcomes 
The difference between administration and administrative receivership may also 
be expected to have several other effects on outcomes: 
 
Time in bankruptcy 
Administration proceedings are limited to one year, although this may be 
extended with the permission of the court or of a majority of the creditors.
8
 
Receivership proceedings, although commonly thought to be ‘quick’, are not 
subject to any legal time limit. Citron et al (2004) found that, in a sample of 65 
receiverships, only 3.1% were completed within one year and 37% took more 
than 3 years.  
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Mode of exit 
The common criticism of receivership would imply that receivers close down 
good businesses unnecessarily. If the perverse incentive problem has been 
resolved by the new mechanisms of governance in administration, then we 
would expect to see more going concern sales, and more trading activity, in 
administration. 
Creditor recoveries 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that gross recoveries are likely to be larger in 
administration than in administrative receivership. Hypothesis 2 predicts that 
costs will, however, also increase too. It is difficult to predict a priori how these 
two predicted changes might interact to affect net recoveries for creditors, 
which are the value of recoveries minus costs.  
 
4. Data Description and Methodology 
We study data on asset realisations and costs incurred in UK bankruptcy 
proceedings before and after the changes introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, 
which came into force on 15 September 2003. We use a hand-constructed 
dataset of 348 cases of formal insolvency to compare receiverships under the 
old law with administrations under the new law.  This is a slightly larger sample 
than the largest similar dataset that has been studied in relation to bankruptcy 
costs in the US (Bris et al, 2006). 
 
A random sample of 500 cases, comprising 250 receiverships commencing 
between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 250 administrations 
commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004,
9
 were first 
identified using the index of insolvency appointments published in the London 
Gazette. Data relating to each case were then entered manually from reports 
filled at the UK public register of companies, Companies House, by insolvency 
practitioners.
10
 From the Statement of Affairs form, which must be filed shortly 
after the practitioner’s appointment, we extracted the book value of assets, the 
directors’ estimate of the market value of the company’s assets, and the amount 
of creditors’ claims, all as of the beginning of proceedings. Insolvency 
practitioners are also required to file progress reports as the proceedings 
continue, and final statements of receipts and payments on completion of a case. 
From these, we collect information on the duration of the bankruptcy procedure, 
the realisation value of the firm’s assets (that is, their postbankruptcy market 
value), the total remuneration paid to the insolvency practitioner and other 
bankruptcy-related direct costs, and distributions made to creditors. We exclude 
cases for which the bankruptcy procedure was not completed by 1 February 
2006, and cases for which the relevant abstracts of receipts and payments were 
not available in electronic form via the Companies House Direct service.
11
 This 
yielded a sample of 153 receiverships and 195 administrations, as shown in 
Table 2.  
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Table 2: Year of companies entering receivership and administration 
 
The table shows the year in which our sample cases entered bankruptcy proceedings. Random samples of 
250 receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 250 
administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004, respectively, were 
first identified using the index of insolvency appointments published in the London Gazette. Data 
relating to each case were then entered manually from reports filed at Companies House by 
insolvency practitioners. We only include cases in which the insolvency procedure had been 
completed by February 2006 and cases for which the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts and Payments 
or Administrator’s Progress Report are available in electronic form on the Companies House website 
(www.direct.companieshouse.gov.uk). 
 
 
Type of proceedings 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Receivership 23 79 51  153 
Administration   42 153 195 
Total 23 79 93 153 348 
 
 
Table 3: Firm characteristics and compositions 
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 
administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. Panel A gives the age, 
duration of bankruptcy, turnover, number of employees, the book value of assets at the latest available 
financial statement (extracted from FAME), and the estimated market value of assets at the time of entry 
into bankruptcy (from the statement of affairs). Panel B describes the proportion of firms continuing to 
trade during the bankruptcy proceedings. Panel C describes the outcome of the insolvency process: going 
concern sale or piecemeal sale. Panel D describes the eight categories of industry based on the 1 digit 
SIC code. 
 
Panel A Firm characteristics 
 Receivership Administration 
 Mean median Mean median 
t-test for 
differences 
of mean 
Duration of bankruptcy (days) 622 610 356 358 2.96* 
Age (years) 14.9 9.8 16.9 14.9 -1.09 
Employees 85 60 83 57 0.20 
Turnover  (£000) 7,000 4,194 6,682 1,932 0.44 
Book value of assets from last 
annual accounts (£000)  
3,318 1,521 2,173 846 0.94 
Estimated market value of assets 
on entry to bankruptcy (£000)  
822 473 656 195 0.96 
 
Panel B Trade or not 
 Receivership Administration 
Group Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
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Continue trade 33 32.3% 45 24.7% 
No trade 69 67.7% 137 75.3% 
Total 102 100% 182 100% 
 
Panel  C outcomes 
 Receivership Administration 
Group Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Going concern whole sales 43 42.5% 65 35.7% 
Going concern half sales 3 2.9% 11 6.0% 
Piecemeal sales 56 54.6% 106 58.3% 
Total 102 100% 182 100% 
 
Panel D: Industry components 
 Receivership Administration 
Industrial Group Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (1) 0 0 1 0.57% 
Mining (2) 15 10.79% 10 5.75% 
Construction (3) 39 28.06% 42 24.14% 
Manufacturing (4) 12 8.63% 23 13.22% 
Transportation, communication, 
electric, gas and sanitary services 
(5) 
10 7.19% 24 13.79% 
Wholesale trade (6) 27 19.42% 39 22.41% 
Retail trade (7) 10 7.19% 9 5.17% 
Service (8) 26 18.71% 26 14.94% 
Total 139 100% 174 100% 
* Significance at 5% level. 
 
 
To explore the pattern of realisations and insolvency cost across different firm 
characteristics, further information about the firm’s SIC industry code and 
accounting data was obtained from the FAME database.
12
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on various characteristics of sample firms. 
As can be seen, Panel A shows that the average duration of proceedings (1) for 
receivership (mean 622 days, median 610 days) was nearly twice as long as for 
administration (mean 356 days, median 358 days). This is consistent with 
expectations: administration proceedings are subject to a statutory time limit of 
one year (extendable with the consent of the court or of creditors), whereas 
receivership has no fixed time limit.
13
 The ages of firms (2) in the receivership 
and administration samples are not significantly different. We also present 
descriptive statistics for two binary indicators of outcomes: trading versus 
closure (3) and going concern versus piecemeal sales (4). In each case, the 
receivership and administration samples are very similar. Panel D reports the 
distribution of the sample firms by industry at the 1-digit SIC code level. It 
appears that approximately 45% of the sample in the two respective proceedings 
is comprised of firms in the construction industry and in wholesale trading. 
However, the overall industry composition of the two proceeding subsample is 
similar. 
 
4.1 Realisations  
Insolvency practitioners in receivership and administration cases are required to 
submit to the Registrar of Companies, at six-monthly intervals, a ‘Receiver’s 
Abstract of Receipts and Payments’ or an ‘Administrator’s Progress Report’, 
respectively. When assets are sold during the reporting period, the gross 
realisations must be entered as receipts and related costs entered as payments. 
We classify the receipt items as the asset realisations and the associated costs as 
direct insolvency costs on the grounds that costs of these types (namely, legal 
fees, investigation fees, advertisement fees, and appraisal fees) are normally 
unavoidable and are  related to the efforts beings made by the insolvency 
practitioners to realise value for the creditors. 
 
However, in cases where the insolvency practitioner continued to operate the 
business as a going concern, it would be inappropriate to treat operating costs as 
part of the costs of the insolvency procedure. To help distinguish sums received 
and paid in the course of trading from asset realisations and associated costs, 
administrators typically provide a separate trading receipts and payments 
account in cases where the business continued to operate.
14
 Hence, to ensure 
robustness, three measures of realisations were employed in our study: 
 
A1: total asset realisations 
A2: total asset realisations + gross trading receipts 
A3: total asset realisations + net trading receipts  
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Simply comparing realisations, of course, would not give a meaningful 
comparison between procedures unless those figures can be standardised by a 
measure of firm size. Consistently with prior literature (LoPucki and Doherty, 
2004; Bris et al., 2006), we use the estimated value of the firm’s assets at entry 
into bankruptcy as an indicator of size. The value is extracted from the 
Statement of Affairs prepared by directors shortly after an insolvency 
practitioner is appointed. The directors are required to provide an abbreviated 
balance sheet containing their best estimate of the current value of the firm’s 
assets and liabilities as at the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
Thus, the ratio of the value of actual realisations in bankruptcy to the estimated 
(prebankruptcy) value of the firm’s assets (‘total assets’) yields one measure of 
the ‘effectiveness’ of the insolvency practitioner in realising assets. To be sure, 
the directors’ estimates are not audited, and may well be subject to an optimism 
bias. Provided that this does not differ systematically as between administration 
and administrative receivership—and we have no reason for thinking that it 
should—then this ratio can nevertheless provide a meaningful way of 
comparing the effectiveness of the two procedures. When combined with the 
three definitions of actual realisations, this yields three different ‘realisation 
ratios’, summarised in Figure 2 as follows: 
 
Figure 2: three measures of realisation ratio 
Scaling 
factor 
Realisations 
 Asset realisations Asset realisations + 
gross sales 
Asset realisations+ 
net sales 
Total 
assets 
 A1:Total asset realisations
 
 total assets
 [ ]A2: Total asset realisations + gross sales
total assets
 [ ]A3: Total asset realisations + net sales
total assets
 
 
4.2 Costs 
Two measures of the direct costs of insolvency proceedings were employed: (i) 
the remuneration paid to insolvency practitioners, and (ii) total direct costs 
(comprising, in addition to insolvency practitioner remuneration, all the costs 
associated with the realisation of the assets, e.g. legal fees, estate agent fees, 
document fees, etc). In order to interpret the results meaningfully across the two 
different proceedings, the costs also need to be standardised by a measure of 
firm size. We use two measures as a scale factor: (i) the estimated market value, 
from the Statement of Affairs, of the firm’s total assets on entry into bankruptcy 
and (ii) the value of the actual realisations in bankruptcy. As we have three 
definitions for asset realisations, the remuneration costs and total direct costs 
were then divided by total assets and each of the three proxies for actual 
realisations to yield eight measures of the ‘costliness’ of insolvency procedures. 
These are set out in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3 
Scaling factor Remuneration Total direct costs 
Total assets: 
 R1: Remuneration  
 total assets
 C1: Direct insolvency costs
total assets
 
Asset realisations: 
(1) asset 
realisations 
R2: Remuneration  
 Total asset realisations
 C2: Direct insolvency costs
Total asset realisations
 
(2) asset 
realisations plus 
gross sales 
R3: Remuneration  
 Total asset realisations+gross sales
 C3: Direct insolvency costs
Total asset realisations+gross sales
 
(3) asset 
realisations plus 
net sales 
R4: Remuneration  
 Total asset realisations+net trade sales
 C4: Direct insolvency costs
Total asset realisations+net trade sales
 
 
4.3 Creditor Recoveries 
The recovery rate is calculated as the distribution to a class of debt over the face 
of the claims. The recovery rate is thus subclassified into total recovery rate, 
secured creditor recovery rate, preferential creditor recovery rate and unsecured 
recovery rate. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for each of our three measures of actual 
realisations, as a percentage of total assets (that is, actual postbankruptcy market 
values as a proportion of estimated prebankruptcy market values). So far as 
realisation ratios are concerned, the means of each of the measures (A1-A3) are 
higher in administration than in receivership, the difference of which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. When actual realisations are measured 
as total asset realisations, the actual realisations for administration average 98% 
of total assets, the figure of which is much higher than the realisation ratio for 
receivership, 78% of total assets. When net trading sales are included in the 
calculation for the actual realisations, the administration cases have a mean 
realisation ratio of about 103% of total assets, which is much higher than the 
77% of total assets reported in receivership. These results are consistent with 
our first hypothesis that realisations are expected to be larger in administration 
than administrative receivership. 
 
Turning to costs ratios, Table 5 shows the summary statistics for remuneration 
cost and total direct costs as a percentage of total assets and actual realisations. 
Overall the means are universally higher in administration than administrative 
receivership and all the differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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This evidence tends to support our second hypothesis, namely that the costs are 
likely to be larger in administration than in administrative receivership. 
 
Panel A in Table 5 first measures costs as a proportion of pre-insolvency assets. 
The mean (median) remuneration cost to total assets for administration is 29% 
(19%), which is much higher than 16% (11%) in receivership. The figures in 
Panel A should in principle be comparable with those derived from earlier 
studies giving costs as a fraction of prebankruptcy values.
15
 Both the UK 
procedures appear to have higher direct costs, by this measure, than those 
reported by Lawless and Ferris (2000) and Bris et al (2006) for Chapter 11 
proceedings in the US.   
 
The total direct costs for administration cases are also higher than the direct 
costs for receivership, by a margin of 21% (16%) of total assets. Panels B to D 
of Table 5 respectively use each of our three different definitions of actual 
realisations as the denominator. In each case, the cost ratio for administration is 
significantly higher than the ratio for receivership. For example, remuneration 
costs amount to 26% (21%) of asset realisations plus gross trading sales in 
administration, as opposed to 22% (15%) in receivership. The measures in 
Panel C should in principle be comparable with earlier studies giving costs as a 
fraction of gross receipts in bankruptcy. The figures for receivership are similar 
to those reported by Citron et al (2004) for a sample of UK receiverships and 
Thorburn (2000) for the Swedish auction bankruptcy procedure.  
 
Finally, Table 6 shows the results for recovery rates in different classes of 
claims. An average of 21% of total claims was repaid in both of receivership 
and administration proceedings.  Although, as shown in Table 4, the realisation 
ratio for administration is a significant improvement on that in receivership, the 
total recoveries for creditors are not affected in any statistically significant way 
by the choice of proceedings. There is also little difference in the recovery rate 
for secured creditors between the administration cases and receivership cases. 
Thus, in conjunction with Tables 4 and 5, Table 6 implies that whilst 
administration encourages insolvency practitioners to work more effectively in 
generating recoveries for creditors, this potential benefit to creditors is eaten up 
by concomitantly increased costs. Thus there is no net benefit for creditors in 
administration, as opposed to receivership.  
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Table 4 Total realisations as a percentage of the estimate value of assets at the commencement of insolvency  
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 
December 2004. Realisations are obtained from the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts and Payments form (in receiverships) and the Administrator’s Progress 
Report form (in administration). Three measures of actual realisations are employed: A1=total asset realisation, A2=(total asset realisation + gross sales) and 
A3=(total asset realisation + net sales). Total assets are the estimated value of total assets at entry into bankruptcy, extracted from the Statement of Affairs 
prepared by directors shortly after an insolvency practitioner is appointed. 
 
 AD RE AD RE Diff  
(t -value) 
AD RE A
D 
RE AD RE 
 OBS mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Realisation : 
(1)  A1:Total asset realisations  
 total assets
 182 102 0.98 0.78 2.30* 0.88 0.69 
0
.
0
0.002 5.30 4.19 
            
(2) 
[ ]A2: Total asset realisations + gross trade sales
total assets
 182 102 1.22 0.84 3.21* 0.99 
0.7
5 
0
.
0
0.002 9.12 4.25 
            
(3) 
[ ]A3: Total asset realisations + net trade sales
total assets
 182 102 1.03 0.77 2.98* 0.93 
0.6
7 
0
.
0
7 
0.002 5.30 3.92 
 
 (note1):* denotes significance at 5%
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Table 5 Remuneration and direct insolvency costs as a percentage of the estimate value of assets at the commencement of insolvency and as a percentage of the 
actual realisation 
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. 
Remuneration costs and total direct costs are obtained from the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts and Payments form (in receivership) and the Administrator’s Progress 
Report form (in administrations). Total direct costs comprise all the costs specific to the bankruptcy proceedings (including remuneration costs, legal fees, estate agent 
fees, and document fees), but excluding operating costs associated with trading, where applicable. Total assets are the estimated market value of total assets at entry into 
bankruptcy, extracted from the Statement of Affairs prepared by directors shortly after an insolvency practitioner is appointed. Three measures of actual realisations are 
used: A1=total asset realisation, A2=(total asset realisation + gross sales) and A3=(total asset realisation + net sales). 
 
 AD RE AD RE Diff (t value) AD RE AD RE AD RE 
 OBS Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: as a percentage of the estimate value of assets 
(1)        Remuneration  
 total assets
 182 102 0.29 0.16 3.71* 0.19 0.11 0.007 0 2.45 1.12 
(2)        Direct insolvency costs
total assets
 182 102 0.49 0.28 4.04* 0.33 0.17 0.007 0.0003 3.67 1.34 
Panel B: as a percentage of the actual realisation R1[total asset realisations] 
(1)   Remuneration  
 Total asset realisations
 182 102 0.29 0.23 2.63* 0.24 0.17 0.007 0.002 0.77 0.75 
(2)      Direct insolvency costs
Total asset realisations
 182 102 0.49 0.38 3.27* 0.43 0.29 0.007 0.02 1.30 0.97 
Panel C: as a percentage of the actual realisation R2[total asset realisations + gross trade sales] 
(1)   Remuneration  
 Total asset realisations+gross sales
 182 102 0.26 0.22 2.06* 0.21 0.15 0.007 0 0.77 0.75 
(2)      Direct insolvency costs
Total asset realisations+gross sales
 182 102 0.45 0.36 2.51* 0.38 0.25 0.007 0.010 1.00 0.98 
 AD RE AD RE Diff (t value) AD RE AD RE AD RE 
 OBS mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Panel D: as a percentage of the actual realisation R2[total asset realisations + gross trade sales] 
(1)   Remuneration  
 Total asset realisations+net trade sales
 182 102 0.28 0.23 2.19* 0.23 0.18 0.007 0 0.77 0.75 
(2)      Direct insolvency costs
Total asset realisations+net trade sales
 182 102 0.47 0.38 2.71* 0.41 0.29 0.007 0.019 1.00 0.98 
 
  
2
0
 
 
Table 6 Summary statistics of total recovery rate  
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 
December 2004. The recovery rate is calculated as the distribution paid to a class of debt as a proportion of the face value of their claims. The recovery 
rate is subclassified into total recovery rate, secured creditor recovery rate, preferential creditor recovery rate and unsecured recovery rate. 
 
 
 AD RE AD RE Diff  
(t -value) 
AD RE AD RE AD RE 
 OBS mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Recovery rate : 
(1)  Total recovery rate 182 102 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.12 0 0.0003 1.00 1.00 
            
(2) recovery rate to secured creditors 141 101 0.61 0.55 1.10 0.78 0.62 0 0 1.00 1.00 
            
(3) recovery rate to preferential creditors 103 96 0.36 0.25 1.87 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 
            
(4) recovery rate to unsecured creditors 182 102 0.006 0.002 1.05 0 0 0 0 0.27 0.19 
 
 (note1):* denotes significance at 5% for both table 5 & 6
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5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
We next analyse the determinants of realisations, remuneration costs, and total 
direct costs in a multivariate framework. Based on our expectations, we try to 
relate actual realisations, remuneration costs and total costs to a series of 
explanatory variables. As the summary statistics reported in Section 5.1 indicate 
that the type of bankruptcy procedure matters in relation to realisations and 
costs incurred, we first create a dummy variable which takes a value of one for 
administration cases and zero for receivership cases. In addition, we include two 
binary variables to reflect, respectively, whether the firm continues trading in 
bankruptcy and whether the disposal of the firm is based on a going concern 
sale or break-up sale. This is because we expect the realisations and costs to be 
positively correlated with continued trading and/or going concern sales. A going 
concern sale may be expected to realise a higher valuation than a piecemeal 
asset sale. Continuing to trade can either facilitate a going concern sale, or 
permit the insolvency practitioner to work through existing contracts and yield 
higher values for assets such as stock in trade and receivables. In both cases, 
however, these steps are likely to require more effort and therefore yield higher 
costs, than a straightforward closure and fire sale. We also include explanatory 
variables for duration of proceedings, a size factor (the estimated market value 
of total assets, taken from the Statement of Affairs), and industry sector.  
 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
1 2 3
log(Realisations)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcome
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industry
log(Remuniration)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcom
α β β β
β β β
α β β β
× × ×
× × ×
× × ×
4 5 6
1 2 3
4 5
e
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industry
log(direct costs)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcome
                          + log (duration) + log (total as
β β β
α β β β
β β
× × ×
× × ×
× × 6sets)+ industryβ ×
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Where  
Realisations  = a. total asset realisations 
b: total asset realisations + gross trading 
receipts 
c: total asset realisations + net trading 
receipts 
dum_proceed  = 1 if the insolvency procedure is 
administration  
  0 if the insolvency procedure is 
receivership 
dum_trade  = 1 if the insolvency practitioner continues to 
trade 
  0 if the insolvency practitioner ceases to 
trade 
dum_outcome  = 1 if the outcome is going concern sales 
  0 if the outcome is piecemeal sales 
duration  = Days in insolvency 
log (total assets)  = Natural logarithm of estimated value of 
assets at the beginning of the insolvency 
industry  = Eight category of industry based on the 1 
digit SIC code level. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of regression of the logarithm of the asset realisations 
against three binary variables [proceedings, outcome, and trade], two logarithm 
variables [duration and estimated value of assets], and one categorical variable 
[industry]. As the dependent variable is a natural logarithm of the realisation 
figure, the slope coefficient measures the elasticity of the realisation amount 
with respect to explanatory variables. That is, when the explanatory variable is 
also a natural logarithm, the coefficient indicates the percentage change in the 
amount of realisations amount that is associated with a 1% change in the 
explanatory variable, whilst holding the other variables constant. For example, 
when realisation is defined as the asset realisations (A1), for the binary 
variables, the 5% significance of the coefficient 1β  indicates that the amount of 
realisations is 48% higher in administration than in receivership, holding the 
other variables constant. Overall, the amount of the actual realisations in the 
specifications are positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
administration (as opposed to receivership), length of time in proceedings, a 
decision to continue to trade (as opposed to closure), and the size of the firm (as 
represented by asset values). 
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Table 7 Determinants of realisations 
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 
administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. Realisations are obtained 
from the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts and Payments form (in receivership) and the Administrator’s 
Progress Report form (in administration). Three measures of realisations are employed: A1=total asset 
realisation, A2=(total asset realisation + gross sales) and A3=(total asset realisation + net sales). 
dum_proceed takes the value of one in an administration case and zero for receivership; 
dum_trade  equals one if the firm continues to trade in bankruptcy; dum_outcome  equals one if the 
outcome is a going concern sale; duration  is the length of the proceeding; total assets is the 
estimated market value of the firm’s assets at the beginning of the insolvency from the Statement of 
Affairs; industry indicates the eight categories of industry based on the 1 digit SIC code level. 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
log(Realisations)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcome
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industry
α β β β
β β β
× × ×
× × ×
 
 A1 A2 A3 
Constant -0.46 0.19 0.13 
 (-0.42) (0.17) (0.12) 
    
0.48 0.48 0.48 Dum_proceed  
(3.50*) (3.56*) (3.54*) 
    
Dum_trade 0.49 0.92 0.61 
 (3.80*) (7.27*) (4.61*) 
    
Dum_outcome 0.11 0.05 0.03 
 (1.04) (0.43) (1.17) 
    
Log(duration) 0.48 0.35 0.36 
 (2.99*) (2.24*) (2.32*) 
    
Log(assets) 0.73 0.74 0.74 
 (18.88*) (19.23*) (19.44*) 
    
Industry  0.00009 0.006 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.22) (0.07) 
    
observations 261 261 261 
Adjusted R2 66.67% 70.45% 68.27% 
(Note 1) the value in parentheses indicates the t-statistics and * denotes significance at 5%  
 
Table 8 contains estimated coefficients and t-statistics from regressions of 
remuneration costs and total direct costs on the explanatory variables. The same 
other explanatory variables (proceedings dummy, log duration, trading dummy,  
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Table 8 Determinants of remuneration and total costs 
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 
administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004.  Remuneration costs and 
total direct costs are obtained from the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts and Payments form (in 
receivership) and the Administrator’s Progress Report Form (in administration). Total direct costs 
comprises remuneration costs, legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc. dum_proceed  takes 
the value of one in an administration case and zero for receivership; dum_trade  equals one if the 
firm continues to trade in bankruptcy; dum_outcome  equals one if the outcome is a going concern 
sale; duration  is the length of bankruptcy; total assets is the estimated market value of assets at the 
beginning of the bankruptcy, from the Statement of Affairs; industry indicates the eight categories of 
industry based on the 1 digit SIC code level. 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
1 2 3
log(Remuneration)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcome
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industry
log(direct costs)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcom
α β β β
β β β
α β β β
× × ×
× × ×
× × ×
4 5 6
e
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industryβ β β× × ×
 
 
 Remuneration Direct Costs 
Constant 2.04 2.44 
 (1.78) (2.35*) 
   
0.47 0.46 Dum_proceed  
(3.39*) (3.66*) 
   
Dum_trade 0.83 0.61 
 (6.53*) (5.37*) 
   
Dum_outcome 0.09 0.02 
 (0.94) (0.20) 
   
Log(duration) 0.51 0.46 
 (3.09*) (3.06*) 
   
Log(assets) 0.39 0.45 
 (10.2*) (12.8*) 
   
Industry  -0.01 -0.03 
 (-0.5) (-1.16) 
   
observations 261 261 
Adjusted R2 49.61% 54.74% 
 (Note 1) the value in parentheses indicates the t-statistics and * denotes significance at 5%  
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going concern sale dummy, industry code and log assets) are employed in each 
of the specifications. Consistently with the predictions, and with the descriptive 
statistics, all five specifications show that the bankruptcy procedure used makes 
an economically, and statistically significant difference to the ratio of costs to 
total value of the realisations. 
 
They first indicate that the costs are higher in administration cases than in 
receivership cases. Cases in which the insolvency practitioner decides to carry 
on the trading can result in higher remuneration costs and total direct costs, and 
all of the costs are positively correlated with the length of proceedings. 
Moreover, as would be expected, costs are larger in larger firms. We find little 
evidence of any industry effect, or that the choice between going concern sale 
and piecemeal sale has costs implications.  
 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis: Decomposition to Under- and Over-secured 
Cases 
It will be recalled that our first hypothesis, that administration would yield 
greater realisations, is based on the idea that the introduction of legal 
mechanisms designed to render the insolvency practitioner accountable to the 
residual claimant (as in administration) as opposed to senior claimants (as in 
receivership) will improve her incentives to raise value. If this is indeed the 
reason why recoveries in administration tend to be larger than in receivership, 
we would expect to see the effect being most pronounced in situations where 
the senior debt is oversecured: this is the circumstance that may give rise to 
inadequate incentives on the part of an office-holder acting solely for the senior 
creditor. 
 
To test this, we decompose our sample into an over-secured group and an 
under-secured group, and re-examine the determinants of actual realisations and 
remuneration and direct costs in these two groups. If the new mechanism of 
administration can mitigate the perverse incentive problem, we expect that the 
increase in realisations from the administrative cases should be largely driven 
by the over-secured subsample. 
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Table 9 Determinants of realisations for over-secured group and under-secured 
group  
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 
administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. A firm is classified as 
‘over-secured’if the estimated value of total assets at the entry to bankruptcy is larger than the face 
value of secured creditors’claims. Realisations are obtained from the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts 
and Payments form (in receivership) and the Administrator’s Progress Report form (in 
administration). Three measures of realisations are used : A1=total asset realisation, A2=(total asset 
realisation + gross sales) and A3=(total asset realisation + net sales). dum_proceed takes the value of 
one in an administration case and zero for receivership; dum_trade  equals one if the firm continues 
to trade in bankruptcy; dum_outcome  equals one if the outcome is a going concern sale; duration  
is the length of the proceeding; total assets is the estimated market value of the firm’s assets at the 
beginning of the insolvency from the Statement of Affairs; industry indicates the eight categories of 
industry based on the 1 digit SIC code level. 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
log(Realisations)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcome
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industry
α β β β
β β β
× × ×
× × ×
 
 Over-secured group Under-secured group 
 A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3 
Constant -0.78 -0.47 -0.61 1.57 2.78 2.49 
 (-0.59) (-0.35) (-0.45) (0.60) (1.12) (1.02) 
       
0.63 0.68 0.71 0.15 0.19 0.07 Dum_proceed  
(3.57*) (3.80*) (3.89*) (0.55) (0.72) (0.27) 
       
Dum_trade 0.44 0.83 0.52 0.67 0.98 0.86 
 (2.90*) (5.37*) (3.35*) (2.30*) (7.42*) (3.17*) 
       
Dum_outcome 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.26 0.12 0.17 
 (1.34) (0.88) (1.17) (1.15) (0.54) (0.79) 
       
Log(duration) 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.56 0.37 0.39 
 (2.98*) (2.44*) (2.51*) (1.50) (1.05) (1.11) 
       
Log(assets) 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.58 0.57 0.59 
 (15.34*) (15.25*) (15.21*) (6.91*) (7.12*) (7.44*) 
       
Industry  0.01 0.01 0.007 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.34) (0.32) (-0.07) (-1.27) (-1.19) (-1.06) 
       
observations 156 156 156 105 105 105 
Adjusted R2 65.36% 67.73% 64.98% 51.11% 59.26% 56.00% 
 (Note 1) the value in parentheses indicates the t-statistics and * denotes significance at 5%  
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Table 9 reports the estimated coefficients and t-statistics for the determinants of 
realisations in the over-secured and under-secured subsamples. A case is placed 
in the over-secured subsample if the estimated value of total assets at the 
commencement of the insolvency proceedings is larger than the face value of 
the debts owing to secured creditors; otherwise it is placed in the under-secured 
subsample. The pattern of the regression results in the over-secured group is 
consistent with that in the full sample as reported in Table 7. The coefficient for 
the proceeding dummy variable in the over-secured group is around 0.6, at a 5% 
significance level. This suggests that the realisation in administration for over-
secured groups is 60% higher than that in receivership. Conversely, with the 
same regression specification in the under-secured group, we do not find any 
significant improvements of asset realisations from administration. These 
results strongly support the first hypothesis: that the introduction of 
administration proceedings has, by reducing the secured creditor’s control, 
enhanced the insolvency practitioner’s incentive to generate recoveries in 
situations where the senior claims are oversecured.  
 
We also consider the costs effects of bankruptcy procedure choice for situations 
where senior claimants are both over- and undersecured. Table 10 reports the 
estimated coefficients and t-statistics for the determinants of costs between the 
over-secured group and under-secured group. Interestingly, the effect from the 
proceeding dummy is significantly positive in the over-secured group, but 
insignificant in the under-secured group. This suggests that administration is 
leading to increased costs in situations where senior claimants are oversecured, 
but is having relatively little impact where their claims are undersecured. These 
results again support our second hypothesis that the new mechanisms of 
accountability in administration may be expected to result in an increase in 
costs.  
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Table 10 Determinants of remuneration (or total costs) for over-secured group and under-secured 
group  
 
Data are from receiverships commencing between 1 January 2001 and 14 September 2003 and 
administrations commencing between 15 September 2003 and 31 December 2004. A firm is 
classified as ‘over-secured’if the estimated value of total assets at the entry to bankruptcy is 
larger than the face value of secured creditors’claims. Remuneration costs and total direct costs 
are obtained from the Receiver’s Abstract of Receipts and Payments form (in receivership) 
and the Administrator’s Progress Report Form (in administration). Total direct costs 
comprises remuneration costs, legal fees, estate agent fees, document fees, etc. dum_proceed  
takes the value of one in an administration case and zero for receivership; dum_trade  equals 
one if the firm continues to trade in bankruptcy; dum_outcome  equals one if the outcome is a 
going concern sale; duration  is the length of bankruptcy; total assets is the estimated market 
value of assets at the beginning of the bankruptcy, from the Statement of Affairs; 
industry indicates the eight categories of industry based on the 1 digit SIC code level. 
      
1 2 3
4 5 6
1 2 3
log(Remuneration)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcome
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industry
log(direct costs)= + dum_proceed+ dum_trade+ dum_outcom
α β β β
β β β
α β β β
× × ×
× × ×
× × ×
4 5 6
e
                          + log (duration) + log (total assets)+ industryβ β β× × ×
 
 Over-secured group Under-secured group 
 remuneration Total costs remuneration Total costs 
Constant 0.65 0.06 4.58 6.22 
 (0.55) (0.05) (1.89) (2.88*) 
     
0.60 0.76 0.35 0.23 Dum_proceed  
(3.87*) (5.07*) (1.42) (1.05) 
     
Dum_trade 0.65 0.83 1.09 0.83 
 (4.97*) (5.37*) (4.06*) (3.48*) 
     
Dum_outcome 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.17 
 (0.93) (0.34) (0.77) (0.88) 
     
Log(duration) 0.76 0.78 0.32 0.12 
 (4.74*) (4.89*) (0.93) (0.40) 
     
Log(assets) 0.38 0.47 0.29 0.32 
 (9.30*) (3.83*) (3.73*) (4.60*) 
     
Industry  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 (-0.59) (-0.97) (-0.54) (-0.83) 
     
observations 156 156 105 105 
Adjusted R2 52.58% 59.15% 35.80% 38.69% 
(Note 1) the value in parentheses indicates the t-statistics and * denotes significance at 5%  
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5.4 Limitations and Future Research 
There is necessarily a considerable amount of uncertainty involved in the 
application of a new bankruptcy procedure. Empirical results from the early 
years of the Chapter 11 procedure in the US found that the (then) new law had 
given debtors a great deal of power, and creditors correspondingly less 
(LoPucki 1983). However, the law’s effect has tended to become diluted with 
time as participants respond by ‘contracting around’ the law (Baird and 
Rasmussen, 2002; Skeel, 2004). A similar process may well occur in the UK. It 
is therefore too soon to say whether the changes documented in our results will 
persist, or whether they may simply be disequilibrium effects resulting from 
transition. Further research conducted after the Enterprise Act regime has had 
time to ‘bed down’ would shed light on this issue.  
 
However, a study of the immediate impact of a change in the law is nevertheless 
valuable because it offers a more direct comparison of the old and new regimes 
than a study with an intervening gap of several years. The wider the time 
difference between the two samples, the greater the possibility a temporal bias 
may be introduced, if unobserved time-variant effects impact upon the costs and 
recoveries in bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Recent changes in UK bankruptcy law have made it possible to conduct a 
‘natural experiment’ concerning the costs and benefits of secured creditor 
control in bankruptcy. The move in 2003 from receivership to administration 
may be seen in stylised terms as effecting a shift in control rights from secured 
to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. To investigate the impact of 
this change, we present findings from a hand-coded dataset of 348 bankruptcy 
cases, which comprises the largest sample of bankruptcy costs and realisations 
yet reported.  
 
We find that cases conducted under the new administration procedure are much 
quicker than receiverships, taking on average a little over half the time. This is 
entirely consistent with predictions, given the statutory time limit for 
administration proceedings.  
 
Controlling for a range of other explanatory variables, we find that 
administration cases are associated with higher gross recoveries than were 
receiverships. When the sample is decomposed into cases where senior 
claimants are over- and undersecured respectively, we find that the difference in 
recoveries between the old and new procedures appears to be driven by changes 
where senior claimants are oversecured. This is consistent with the intuition that 
greater accountability to unsecured creditors encourages administrators to act 
more effectively to generate recoveries in cases where, as fiduciaries for the 
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senior claimant, they would have lacked sufficient incentives under 
receivership. 
 
However, we also find that administration cases are associated with higher 
direct costs than receiverships, which tend to consume any additional 
recoveries, with the net result that recoveries to creditors are no better. 
Moreover, administrations do not result in any significantly greater incidence of 
continued trading or going-concern sales than did receiverships, indicating that 
the new procedure is not preserving any more employment. 
 
When the sample is decomposed into over and undersecured groups, the 
bankruptcy procedure appears to make no difference to costs in situations where 
the senior claimant is undersecured. This is consistent with theoretical claims 
that in such situations the secured creditor has appropriate incentives to monitor 
costs. However, in cases where the senior claimant is oversecured, their 
incentives to monitor costs are weaker. Nevertheless, the finding that costs have 
increased in oversecured administrations tends to suggest that unsecured 
creditors, who are dispersed and each have a very small stake in the business, 
have even weaker incentives to monitor. It was argued in the theoretical 
literature that in such situations, receivership costs would be “unnecessarily” 
inflated. This presupposed that an alternative mechanism could be devised to 
ameliorate the perceived problem. Administration does not appear to be such a 
mechanism. 
 
Our findings may be summarised as follows: the shift from secured to 
unsecured creditor control has increased the power of the insolvency 
practitioner—the agent—as against the creditors—the principals. The very high 
costs awards under administration imply that in many cases, the professional 
running the case is effectively the residual claimant. In turn, this provides an 
alternative, and less benign, explanation for the increase in gross recoveries 
under the new regime: it is because, with weak monitoring from unsecured 
creditors, insolvency practitioners have themselves become the residual 
claimant in UK bankruptcies: they have a strong incentive to maximise the 
recoveries that will go to pay fee income.  
 
Our results also have more general implications for the debate about bankruptcy 
contracting and the desirability of secured creditor control. The change in UK 
bankruptcy governance, in essence, involves a crossing of the central fault line 
of corporate governance: a shift in control from a concentrated investor to many 
dispersed investors. With concentrated investor control, the main governance 
problem is how to prevent them from extracting rents from other investors. 
With control rights in the hands of dispersed investors, the problem is rather 
how to prevent those managing the firm from extracting rents. No clear 
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consensus has emerged as to which of these is preferable. Our results imply that 
concentrated creditor governance in bankruptcy, in the form of strong control 
rights allocated to a single concentrated lender, does on average at least as good 
a job at preserving jobs and generating recoveries for creditors as does a 
relatively sophisticated legal procedure designed to allocate control to the 
residual claimant.  
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Notes 
 
1
 The new law came into force on 15 September 2003. 
2
 However, the extent to which it was really necessary to provide a mechanism 
for reorganisation as well as asset sales (whether on a going concern or 
piecemeal basis) was questionable, as many reorganisations are effected 
informally outside bankruptcy proceedings (Franks and Sussman, 2005).  
3
 The proposals must be circulated within eight weeks, and the meeting must be 
held within ten weeks: UK Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 49, 51. 
4
 The default position is that no meeting need be held where the administrator 
considers that the unsecured creditors will not share in any recoveries; in this 
case the administrator is required simply to act in the interests of secured 
creditors, and a meeting is only called if requested by a creditor or creditors 
owed at least 10% of the company’s total debts (UK Insolvency Act 1986 Sch 
B1, para 52; UK Insolvency Rules 1986, rr. 2.38, 2.40-42). 
5
 UK Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 3-4. 
6
 Only the holder of a floating charge could appoint an administratrive receiver 
(UK Insolvency Act 1986 s 29(2)). The floating charge has a lower priority 
ranking than other forms of secured debt in UK corporate insolvencies (see 
Ferran, 1999). Thus in situations where the face value of total secured debt is 
more than the value of the firm’s assets, the floating charge holder will be 
undersecured.  
7
 These costs seem somewhat higher than those reported by Lawless and Ferris 
(2000) and Bris et al (2006) for Chapter 11 proceedings in the US. However, it 
is likely that this is because the salary of managers of firms in Chapter 11 is 
reported as an operating expense as opposed to a ‘bankruptcy’ cost, meaning 
that procedures in which the firm is managed by an outside appointee may be 
expected to generate higher reported direct costs. This conjecture is supported 
by results from Lawless and Ferris (1997) and Bris et al (2006) suggesting that 
US Chapter 7 proceedings have significantly higher direct costs than Chapter 
11. 
8
 UK Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1, para 76. 
9
 The corporate bankruptcy provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 came into 
force on 15 September 2003.  
10
 For details of the forms that must be completed by Insolvency Practitioners 
running a case, see Companies House (2005), chs 3&4.  
11
 See www.direct.companieshouse.gov.uk  
12
 The FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database provides detailed 
company accounting and financial information on UK and Irish public and 
private firms. 
13
 See above, section 3.3. 
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14
 In most of the receivership cases, the receiver did not provide a separate 
trading receipt and payment accounts. In these cases, information on gross 
trading receipts and net trading receipts was identified from the receiver’s 
general ‘abstract of receipts and payments’ report.  
15
 See above, section 3.2. 
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